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Nolm, LLC v. County of Clark, 100 P.3d 658 (Nev. 2004)1
CONTRACTS – PROPERTY DEEDS
Summary
Clark County (“the County”) wanted to sell the remnants of two parcels of land
after finishing constructing five lanes at the Desert Inn Arterial. The combined acreage
of the two parcels totaled .49 acres.
At a public auction, the County advertised the land under the former legal
description, which described the property as being .92 acres. Neil Ohriner, the sole
owner of Nolm, LLC, realized the legal property description was incorrect. He then bid
on the parcels, winning them for $340,000.00. The Grant, Bargain, and Sale Deed
delivered to escrow likewise incorrectly described the property as .92 acres. After
escrow closed, Ohriner subsequently transferred the deed to Nolm.
After the sale, the County taxed Ohriner $1,050,480.00 on one parcel and
$81,310.00 on the other, taxes based on the full .92 acres. When Ohriner brought the
issue of the tax amounts to the County’s attention, he was given two options: either
voluntarily reform the deed to describe the appropriate parcel sizes, or rescind the entire
contract for the full purchase price plus taxes. Ohriner instead filed a complaint against
the County for trespass, inverse condemnation, and private nuisance. The County filed a
counter-suit, seeking reformation of the deed, or rescission of the contract, plus attorney’s
fees and costs.
The district court considered the fact that although Ohriner was aware before
purchasing the property that the legal description was incorrect, he intended to use the
County’s error as a “bargaining chip” if the County opposed his application for an adult
use permit for the property. The district court ordered Ohriner to reform the contract to
reflect the true legal description of the property, .49 acres. Ohriner filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification, arguing that the purchase price and property taxes
should have been abated. His motion was denied, after which Ohriner filed an appeal.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Can a property deed be reformed in favor of a unilaterally mistaken seller who
bears the risk of mistake, when the buyer was aware of the mistake and sought to use it
against the mistaken party?
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Disposition
Yes. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision reforming a
land sale contract where one party makes a unilateral mistake that is known to the
opposing party and where the opposing party deliberately does not bring it to the
mistaken party’s attention.
Commentary
State of the Law Prior to Nolm
Although it is a case of first impression in Nevada, the Nolm decision follows
similar holdings of courts in the majority of western states. In addition, the Nevada
Supreme Court’s holding is also in accord with the applicable provisions of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.2
Other Jurisdictions
The court notes that most of the western states allow for reformation of a writing
where one party makes a unilateral mistake and a party with knowledge of the mistake
fails to make the other party aware.3 More specifically, the court examines the principles
outlined in several cases regarding the reformation of a contract: equity, gross negligence,
and intent.
In an Oregon case, two parties contracted for the sale of real property, having
formalized the contract terms in a letter.4 Thereafter, one party prepared a formal writing
in which the contract terms were different than those outlined in the antecedent letter.
The drafting party knew that the new terms were different, knew that the other party
could not speak English, and knew that the contracting party relied on the representations
of the drafting party as to the contents of the contract. The drafting party, however, did
not disclose the new terms. Owing to these circumstances, the Oregon court held that the
drafting party’s conduct was inequitable and that the contracting party’s mistake was not
the result of gross negligence.5
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With regard to the reformation of a writing to express the terms of the agreement as asserted, the court
turned to the commentary in section 166 of the RESTATEMENT which allows reformation when one party is
mistaken and the other party, aware of the mistake, remains silent. The party’s silence then becomes an
assertion that the writing is as the other understands it to be. Similarly, section 161 of the RESTATEMENT
provides that a party’s silence regarding a fact is tantamount to a declaration that the fact did not exist.
3
Jones v. Reliable Sec., Inc., 29 Kan. App. 2d 617, 28 P.3d 1051, 1062 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (written
instrument may be reformed where there is ignorance or mistake on one side and fraud or inequitable
conduct on the other); Oftedal v. State ex rel. Transp. Com'n, 308 Mont. 50, 40 P.3d 349, 352, 359 (Mont.
2002) (allowed reformation of a contract where a contractor had underbid by such an amount that the other
party was on notice of the mistaken bid); Diamond v. Granite Falls School Dist., 117 Wn. App. 157, 70
P.3d 966, 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (where the school district knew of appellant's mistake when the
parties entered into a contract, the trial court should have relieved appellant from its unilateral mistake).
4
Kish v. Kustura, 190 Ore. App 458, 79 P.3d 337 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
5
Id. at 465.

In the case at bar, Ohriner admitted that he knew of the County’s error in listing
the parcels as .92 acres, but remained silent nevertheless. He hoped to take advantage of
the County’s error. Like the party in the Oregon case, Ohriner’s conduct was inequitable.
The County was not grossly negligent in that the land sale was the result of
multiple inter-governmental departments attempting to coordinate the transaction. The
court sides with the County government asserting that the County department ultimately
responsible for the sale was one which had never before conducted such sales. Mere
miscommunication between inter-governmental departments, therefore, is not gross
negligence.
The intent of the parties to a contract is also an essential element in the case at
hand. In Belk v. Martin6, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a ruling to reform a lease in
which a typographical error, known to one party but not the other, required the payment
of ten times the agreed upon lease amount.
In the present action, the County only intended to sell the remnant parcels, but
Ohriner, like the knowledgeable party in Belk, knew about the written error but failed to
bring it to the opposite party’s attention.
Effect of Nolm on Current Law
The law clearly favors a party without knowledge of a mistake in a contract where
the other party has knowledge of the mistake and plans to use it to their benefit in the
future.
Conclusion
Where one party is aware of a unilateral mistake in the formation of a contract,
and where they deliberately do not notify the other party of the mistake, it is within the
power of Nevada courts to reform the contract. The court must take into account
elements such as the intent of the parties, whether the knowledge of the mistake places
one party in an inequitable position in comparison to the other, and whether a party’s lack
of knowledge as to the mistake is due to gross negligence.
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136 Idaho 652, 39 P.3d 592, 599 (Idaho 2001).

